by Major General (Ret.) K. H. Constantinidis

“The present analysis is not merely a retrospective historical or political assessment. It is the result of personal experience, observations, and knowledge of events as they unfolded during the critical period of 1973–1974, from my position as a senior officer of the Hellenic Armed Forces. The views expressed represent my own assessment of those events, in light of what I personally experienced and understood at the time.”
It is the height of folly that today’s society remains ignorant of what actually happened at the Polytechnic in November 1973. It is equally regrettable that an entire nation is dragged, for three consecutive days, into the delusion of the so-called “Polytechnic Revolution”—an event that should instead be commemorated as a tragic day of reflection, remembrance, and resolve to prevent similar events in the future.
What began as a simple gathering of young people, made possible by the relaxation of the regime’s restrictions and the move toward democratization under the new government of Spyros Markezinis, was branded by the political establishment as a “Revolution.” Ever since, the people of Athens have been burdened with a lie and a farce that culminated in the greatest national tragedy since the Asia Minor Catastrophe.
And consider this: the entire scenario, according to this account, had been orchestrated by the US intelligence services, which had long sought to remove Archbishop Makarios from power in Cyprus. They regarded him as a man of Moscow and wanted him ousted at any cost. Since dictator Georgios Papadopoulos refused to comply with their wishes, they considered the silent head of the Greek Military Police (ESA), Dimitrios Ioannidis, the appropriate person to bring about the desired outcome.
Papadopoulos’s downfall had been predetermined as early as September 1973, when the dictator refused to allow American aircraft bound for Israel to use the bases in Crete during the Yom Kippur War between Egypt and Israel (6 October 1973), while permitting Soviet aircraft to cross Greek airspace on their way to Egypt.
The operation was easy to arrange because the Communist Party, although outlawed, exercised influence over the student movement at the universities. Both the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) and the politically inactive establishment at the time stood to gain from a youth uprising that would bring down the junta. Neither the communist and left-wing instigators nor the politicians were concerned about the ominous prospects facing Cyprus. Their overriding objective was power by any means, even at the cost of sacrificing Cyprus.
Thus, the stage was set for the overthrow of the Papadopoulos regime, which opposed a coup against Makarios, and for its replacement by the convenient fool—or perhaps their agent; this has never been clarified—the invisible dictator Dimitrios Ioannidis.
Neither the foreign powers nor the domestic political forces wanted the transition to democracy as planned by the Papadopoulos regime and the Markezinis government. That was to be a democracy governed by rules, laws, and patriotism, rather than the state of decay and disintegration that characterized the post-junta era.
Even Europe did not want a democratic Greece whose national income was growing by 6–7 percent annually. It was also concerned by Greece’s strong productive base at the time.
Kissinger, however, wanted the partition of Cyprus at all costs, intending it—as indeed it subsequently became—to serve as Israel’s “rear area.” This could not have been achieved while Makarios remained in power.
Turkey, of course, was ready to fill the vacuum that would be created by Makarios’s fall.
On the very day when Ms. Damanaκη was shouting “This is the Polytechnic,” the partition of Cyprus was being plotted by American strategists, Turkish militarists, and communist instigators whom the author describes as consistently hostile to Greece, exploiting the reckless actions of the youth. The power-hungry Makarios also contributed to this outcome through his obsession with remaining in office, as did irresponsible politicians, both inside and outside Greece, who were seeking an opportunity to return to their homeland and regain power.
The Polytechnic uprising, therefore, was the “triggering fever” that brought about the change of regime and led to the loss of Cyprus, almost without a war—but at a terrible human cost amounting to a catastrophe.
Instead of the politically irresponsible establishment eventually—however belatedly—acknowledging its responsibility and undertaking an act of repentance and self-criticism for the events of that period, it celebrates the restoration of democracy and the Polytechnic uprising.
At the time, some refused to support Markezinis’s democratization process, while others played their game with the Americans behind the scenes. To this day, the file concerning the betrayal of Cyprus has not been made public, so as not to offend the Americans or expose the very protagonists involved.
Everything was fluid at the time, and the CIA was playing the Cyprus game as it pleased.
IN CONCLUSION
1. The Polytechnic uprising was a farce instigated by the communists and exploited by many, above all by the United States.
2. The result of this uprising was the fall of Papadopoulos and the rise to power of the invisible dictator Ioannidis, who carried out the coup against Makarios at the behest of the Americans.
3. Those primarily responsible for the Cyprus tragedy are:
- The United States, as the planners and instigators of the geopolitical maneuvering.
- Turkey, through its invasion, known as Attila.
- Dimitrios Ioannidis, who organized the coup against Makarios.
- Makarios, driven by his single-minded attachment to power and his appeal to the United Nations for intervention by the guarantor powers (Britain and Turkey) to remove the Sampson junta.
- K. Karamanlis, for his dealings with Kissinger in Paris, allegedly seeking to exploit the Cyprus crisis for his own benefit, as well as for his inaction during Attila II and Greece’s withdrawal from NATO.
- The country’s political establishment, which pursued opportunistic interests and remained inactive during that period.
- The anti-national KKE and the Left, which, in the author’s view, have consistently betrayed the country. The same pattern, he argues, was evident in the Cyprus issue, as well as in the Polytechnic uprising, the Prespa Agreement, the December events of 1944, the Civil War, and elsewhere.
4. The Greek people, as a whole, did not take part in the “spectacle” of the Polytechnic uprising. Thus, the transition took place smoothly from one dictatorship to another.
5. Ever since, although it was the United States that brought about Attila, the post-junta political establishment has turned the issue into a Greek-Turkish dispute. After numerous phases and concessions, the goal of Cyprus’s reunification has been forgotten. Turkey has established a de facto entity of its own, calling it the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC), and is now demanding the reunification of two federated states—effectively seeking the de jure partition of Cyprus.
(16 November 2026)
Major General (Ret.) Konstantinos Constantinidis
Author – Member of the Society of Greek Writers
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