Konstantinos Konstantinidis – Amphiktyon
From 1950 until 1973, when the first successful oil drilling operation took place in Prinos, Turkey did not openly and publicly advance strong claims in the Aegean Sea. Its ambitions were known mainly within diplomatic circles and were reflected in confidential documents and analyses.
I still remember the prophetic words of the late Ambassador Daskalakis during a lecture he delivered to us at the Air War College in 1969:
“Turkey claims the Aegean… In the end, the stronger side will prevail. Therefore, make sure to maintain strong Armed Forces.”
At the time, this statement caused a profound impression upon us, because it was the first time we had heard so clearly the assessment that Turkish policy followed a long-term revisionist strategy.
After 1973 and the beginning of oil extraction from Prinos, Turkey gradually began to express its claims in the Aegean more openly. The situation, however, changed dramatically after 1974 and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, when Ankara started systematically and insistently projecting claims both in the Aegean and in Thrace.
Since then, Turkish policy has escalated progressively: from the casus belli against the extension of Greek territorial waters, to the theories of “grey zones” and later the doctrine of the “Blue Homeland.” Today, Turkey appears to be moving toward a new upgrading of its claims through legislative and geopolitical initiatives.
Although the full content of Turkey’s new moves is not yet entirely clear, it is estimated that the objective is to intensify pressure upon Greece either through diplomatic coercion or through the creation of faits accomplis in the field, as occurred in the past during the Imia crisis.
Turkish strategy often interprets international law selectively, applying it where it serves its interests and rejecting it where it considers it restrictive to its ambitions. A characteristic example is its stance toward the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and its casus belli threat against Greece.
We are living in a period of international instability, where international law is being tested, new armed conflicts are erupting across the globe, and geopolitical rivalries are intensifying. Within such an environment, the long-term avoidance of exercising sovereign rights may be interpreted by Turkey as a sign of hesitation.
Greece possesses capable diplomatic personnel and strong Armed Forces. Nevertheless, what is required is a long-term national strategy, determination, and clear political will.
In my opinion, the following are necessary:
- To examine the extension of Greek territorial waters to 12 nautical miles, in accordance with International Law and the UNCLOS Convention, while providing for international navigation corridors.
- To continue strengthening the defensive fortification of the islands and the Evros region, with emphasis on comprehensive national defense and deterrent capability.
- To accelerate the modernization and operational reinforcement of the Hellenic Armed Forces.
- To systematically raise the issue of Turkish claims in international forums, especially within the European Union, so that a clearer European position may emerge.
- To utilize all diplomatic options available to the country in every direction — including toward Russia — guided by the principles of stability and the protection of national interests.
- To strengthen Greece’s strategic partnerships with countries playing a decisive role in the Eastern Mediterranean, such as the United States, Israel, France, and others.
Greece desires peace, stability, and cooperation among nations. Peace, however, can only be effectively safeguarded when accompanied by strong deterrent capability and national unity.
For Hellenism, the message of history remains timeless:
“MOLON LABE” (“Come and take them”)
(19/5/26)
Amphiktyon – Major General (Ret.) Konstantinos Konstantinidis
Author – Member of the Society of Greek Writers
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