{"id":4629,"date":"2026-08-24T17:56:09","date_gmt":"2026-08-24T14:56:09","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/amphiktyon.org\/?p=4629"},"modified":"2026-08-24T17:57:22","modified_gmt":"2026-08-24T14:57:22","slug":"preemptive-strike","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/amphiktyon.org\/?p=4629","title":{"rendered":"PREEMPTIVE STRIKE?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

By Lieutenant General (Ret.) K. Ch. Konstantinidis<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

On 18 August 2026<\/strong>, Israel carried out approximately eight strikes against the Abu al-Duhur Air Base<\/strong> in Idlib Province, northwestern Syria, about 80 kilometers from the Turkish border.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The air base was a Syrian<\/strong> facility; however, Israel reportedly had intelligence indicating that Syria was preparing to allow the deployment of Turkish troops, radar systems, and air-defense systems<\/strong> in the area.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This incident constitutes one of many episodes in the already strained Turkey\u2013Israel relations<\/strong>, which could potentially lead even to a preemptive Israeli war against Turkey<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Turkish Military Power<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Turkey, as is well known, has embarked on a rapid arms buildup, particularly in the fields of air power, long-range missile systems, and the construction of naval warships.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

According to our assessment, the areas in which Turkey still lags behind are:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

a. Air Power<\/strong>, since a significant portion of its air fleet continues to rely on older-generation aircraft.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

b. Air Defense<\/strong>, where the Russian-made S-400<\/strong> remains the most prominent long-range air-defense system it has acquired.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Therefore, at present there appears to be a window of opportunity<\/strong> regarding Turkey\u2019s defensive capabilities, which, in our estimation, may close within the next three years.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At that point, Turkey may feel considerably stronger in relation to its neighbors and could choose to undertake military action against them individually in order to advance its strategic objectives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Turkish Objectives<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Turkey openly proclaims its political and military goals.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

1. Toward Greece<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Through the doctrine of the \u201cBlue Homeland\u201d (Mavi Vatan)<\/strong>, Turkey advances claims and challenges in the Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Among other things, it disputes the extent of Greek maritime rights, the status of certain islands in the Eastern Aegean, and issues concerning Western Thrace<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

 2. Toward Cyprus<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Turkish policy on Cyprus seeks to consolidate the results of the Turkish invasion and occupation of the northern part of the island.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

3<\/strong>. Toward Israel<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Turkey has adopted particularly harsh rhetoric toward Israel, accompanied by strong criticism of Israeli policies and the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The confrontation has intensified significantly, and relations between the two countries have deteriorated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Attitude of the West<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Unfortunately, for the time being, both the European Union<\/strong> and the United States<\/strong> do not appear to view Turkish power and ambitions with the degree of concern that, in our opinion, the situation warrants.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

History has shown that, in a number of cases, Western assessments of Turkish policy proved overly optimistic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Turkey\u2019s Policy Toward Greece<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

For the time being, Turkey\u2014because it takes into account Israel\u2019s determination and, in our assessment, the lack of a comparable level of determination on the part of Greece\u2014continues its provocations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

These include challenges to Greek sovereign rights in the Aegean, the continued occupation of nearly half of Cyprus, the Turkish\u2013Libyan Memorandum<\/strong>, aerial violations of Greek sovereign rights, and other actions considered unlawful that further burden Greek\u2013Turkish relations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In contrast, Turkey currently displays greater restraint toward Israel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Turkish media outlets have suggested that the strategic partnership between Greece and Israel<\/strong> could be activated in the event of an Israel\u2013Turkey war<\/strong>, while it is also estimated that American support could be forthcoming.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Under these circumstances, Greece\u2019s cautious stance in the face of the neighboring country\u2019s challenges\u2014which, in our view, exceed the limits of international law and the Law of the Sea\u2014cannot be regarded as a prudent policy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The so-called \u201ccalm waters\u201d<\/strong> should not signify passivity, but rather readiness, deterrence, and determination<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

(24 August 2026)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Konstantinos Constantinidis<\/strong>
Author \u2013 Member of the Society of Greek Writers<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Amphiktyon Blog:<\/strong> http:\/\/www.amphiktyon.blogspot.com<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Amphiktyon Official Site:<\/strong> http:\/\/www.amphiktyon.org<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u03a0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c4\u03b9\u03bc\u03ce \u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03ae \u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03b1\u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b7\u03c3\u03b7<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

By Lieutenant General (Ret.) K. Ch. Konstantinidis On 18 August 2026, Israel carried out approximately eight strikes against the Abu al-Duhur Air Base in Idlib Province, northwestern Syria, about 80 kilometers from the Turkish border. The air base was a Syrian facility; however, Israel reportedly had intelligence indicating that Syria was preparing to allow the deployment of Turkish troops, radar systems, … <\/p>\n

\u03a3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c7\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03b1\u03bd\u03ac\u03b3\u03bd\u03c9\u03c3\u03b7 \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 “PREEMPTIVE STRIKE?”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4629","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/amphiktyon.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4629","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/amphiktyon.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/amphiktyon.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/amphiktyon.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/amphiktyon.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=4629"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/amphiktyon.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4629\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4631,"href":"https:\/\/amphiktyon.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4629\/revisions\/4631"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/amphiktyon.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=4629"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/amphiktyon.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=4629"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/amphiktyon.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=4629"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}